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Whether ﬁnancial market integration raised global insurance is a crucial, still
open issue. All empirical methods to measure cross-border risk-sharing are based
on the implicit assumption that international prices do not ﬂuctuate in response
to business cycle shocks. This paper shows that these methods can be completely
misleading in the presence of large ﬂuctuations in international prices as those ob-
served in the data. I then propose a new empirical method that is immune from this
issue. The risk-sharing ineﬃciency between two countries is measured by the wedge
between their Stochastic Discount Factors (SDFs). This measure is a proxy for the
welfare losses created by imperfect insurance. Welfare losses can be attributed ei-
ther to the strength of uninsurable shocks (the extent of risk to be pooled) or to the
degree of insurance against diﬀerent sources of risk. The method is applied to study
the evolution of risk-sharing between the US and OECD countries, assuming either
constant or time-varying risk-aversion. The degree of insurance is found to have
improved over time only for some countries and only if SDFs are estimated assum-
ing time-varying risk-aversion. The results are also informative on the implications
of diﬀerent macro models for international risk. When confronted with the data,
standard open-macro models (featuring constant risk-aversion) imply that nominal
exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not contain wealth divergences across countries, but
rather represent an important source of risk. Time-varying risk-aversion instead im-
plies that limiting welfare losses from imperfect risk-sharing requires reducing the
volatility of macro fundamentals.
1 Introduction
The last decades have been characterized by a fast process of international ﬁnancial in-
tegration. There is quite a generalized agreement that removing barriers to international
asset trade increased the volume of ﬁnancial resources ﬂowing across borders. Yet whether
ﬁnancial integration eﬀectively raised global insurance and welfare, is still an open issue.
The literature soundly rejected the hypothesis of full insurance against national income
shocks. However, results about the actual degree of international risk-sharing and its
evolution over time are still not conclusive. One reason is that several empirical methods
∗I am grateful to Giancarlo Corsetti, Morten Ravn, Arpad Abraham, Luca Dedola, Charles Engel,
Fabrizio Perri, and participants to seminars at Banco de España, Banca d’Italia, De Nederlandsche
Bank, Bank of Canada, the EUI student forum, and the EUI Macro Lunch Seminar. Contact address:
Banco de España, International Economics Division, C/Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid, Spain. E-mail address:
francesca.viani@bde.es.
1are well-designed to test the null hypothesis of full risk-sharing, but once this null is re-
jected they cannot (by construction) quantify the actual lack of insurance.1 On the other
hand, the methods that were explicitly designed to measure the degree of insurance, are
all based on the implicit assumption that international prices do not ﬂuctuate in response
to business cycle shocks.2 Viani (2010) studied from a theoretical point of view the prob-
lems that can be created by this assumption. Namely, postulating no price ﬂuctuations
implies that international ﬁnancial markets are eﬃcient if they channel resources to coun-
tries that (absent asset trade) would be made relatively poorer by national shocks (net
of physical capital accumulation). Against this standard paradigm, Viani (2010) shows
that the interaction between relative price ﬂuctuations and cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows is
crucial to derive testable conditions for cross-border risk-sharing. In particular, if receiv-
ing an inﬂow from abroad lowers the international price of a country’s output, eﬃcient
ﬁnancial markets should channel resources “upstream”, from poorer to richer countries.
These ﬁnancial ﬂows are optimal, yet they contradict the condition of eﬃciency on which
standard empirical methods are based.
From an empirical perspective, if the assumption of no relative price ﬂuctuations — at
the basis of virtually all empirical tests — might be a relatively innocuous approximation
when measuring insurance among diﬀerent regions within a country (a tasks for which
some of these methods were originally designed), it could be instead problematic when
quantifying cross-border risk-sharing. Indeed, deviations from Purchasing Power Parity
across countries have been estimated to be large and persistent.
In this paper I assess the performance of standard methods in a simulated two-country
DSGE model with endogenous portfolio diversiﬁcation, in which relative price ﬂuctuations
can transfer purchasing power across countries. Results show that standard methods may
be completely misleading in the presence of large movements in international prices as
those observed in the data, as the benchmark of eﬃciency on which they are based is
invalidated.
I then propose a new empirical method to quantify cross-border risk-sharing, which is
immune from these issues. The method consists in estimating the risk-sharing ineﬃciency
between two countries (contingent on the shocks that hit them during a certain period)
using the wedge between their Stochastic Discount Factors (SDFs). This measure rep-
resents a proxy for the aggregate welfare losses created by imperfect insurance. Welfare
losses can then be attributed either to the strength of uninsurable shocks (the extent of
risk to be shared) or to the degree of insurance against diﬀerent sources of risk.
The method is applied to study the evolution of risk-sharing between the US and in-
dustrialized OECD economies over the last forty years, assuming either constant or time-
varying risk-aversion. I ﬁnd that the degree of insurance has improved over time only for
some countries and only if SDFs are estimated assuming time-varying risk-aversion. The
results are also informative on the implications of diﬀerent macro models for international
risk. When confronted with the data, standard open-macro models (postulating constant
risk-aversion) imply that nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not contain wealth diver-
gences across countries, but rather represent an important source of risk. Time-varying
risk-aversion instead implies that limiting welfare losses from imperfect risk-sharing re-
quires reducing the volatility of macro fundamentals.
The ﬁrst part of the paper explores the issues to which standard empirical methods
— based on the assumption of no international price ﬂuctuations — may be subject. To
this aim, I write a simple two-country two-good DSGE model in which relative price
1See for instance Kollmann (1995) and Ravn (2001).
2Among these, the methods developed by Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), Obstfeld (1993),
Brandt, Cochrane and Santa Clara (2006), Flood, Marion and Matsumoto (2008).
2movements can transfer purchasing power across countries, and simulate it under three
diﬀerent asset structures — Financial autarky, trade in uncontingent bonds, and trade
in two equities. By construction Financial autarky gives less or equal insurance against
national supply shocks than the other asset structures. Trade in uncontingent bonds ranks
second, while trade in two equities gives perfect risk-sharing against national disturbances.
I apply diﬀerent empirical methods (respectively, from Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha
(1996), Obstfeld (1993), Brandt, Cochrane and Santa Clara (2006), and Flood, Marion
and Matsumoto (2008)) to the simulated model in order to check if they identify correctly
full risk-sharing in the two-equity case, and if they capture the correct ranking of insurance
among asset structures. The results unveil three typical issues that may aﬀect standard
methodologies. First, the relative value of GDPs commonly used as the independent
variable in risk-sharing regressions, does not necessarily identify which country is made
relatively richer/poorer by national shocks, which makes existing methods potentially
misleading. Second, the interaction between relative prices and ﬁnancial ﬂows may require
eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets to channel resources “upstream”, to relatively richer countries
— a ﬁnding that is typically interpreted as low insurance by existing methods. Finally,
the eﬃcient consumption allocation can be characterized only in conjuncture with relative
price movements: with full insurance national consumption can fall after a negative income
shock, provided consumers are compensated by an appreciation of their currency — a
possibility that is not considered by standard benchmarks of eﬃciency. These issues can
have potentially severe consequences. Not only they can lead to reject full insurance also
when the “true” model features eﬀectively complete asset markets, but they can also lead
to estimate a higher degree of insurance under, say, Financial autarky than in the case
of complete markets. In a world in which relative price ﬂuctuations are realistically large
and sustained, the benchmarks of eﬃciency derived in one-good frameworks and on which
standard methods are based, do not seem to be valid anymore. Most existing empirical
methods may then be easily misleading.
In the remaining of the paper I propose a new method to quantify cross-border risk-
sharing. Macro theory suggests that perfect risk-sharing equalizes the Stochastic Discount
Factors (SDFs) of any two economies in any state of the world. Therefore the risk-sharing
ineﬃciency between countries (or country aggregates) can be measured by the wedge
between their SDFs. Using a simple theoretical framework I prove that this measure of
cross-border risk-sharing, the gap, reﬂects changes in countries’ relative wealth created by
uninsurable shocks. Under certain conditions it also maps into aggregate welfare losses
due to imperfect insurance. I show how its variance can be used to quantify the contingent
risk-sharing ineﬃciency between two countries over a certain time horizon. By regressing
the time-series of the gap estimated from the data on diﬀerent sources of macroeconomic
risk (national GDP volatility, government spending, nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations),
we can test whether households in diﬀerent countries are fully insured against these risks.
Falls in the contingent ineﬃciency over time can be attributed either to reductions in the
strength of uninsurable shocks (the extent of risk to be shared) or to improvements in the
degree of insurance against diﬀerent sources of risk. The performance of this method is
checked using the simulated DSGE model. Results show that the present methodology
properly identiﬁes full-risk sharing and captures the correct ranking of insurance across
diﬀerent asset trade regimes.
Finally, the method is applied to study the evolution of risk-sharing between the US
and 16 industrialized OECD countries over the period 1970-2008. Stochastic Discount
Factors are estimated using two alternative strategies. First, I rely on the assumptions
of standard open-macro models, and assume constant relative risk-aversion. The degree
3of risk-aversion is then estimated from the data using non-linear GMM.3 The second
strategy consists in following Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and postulating a utility
function with time-varying risk-aversion. I adopt the parametrization that was used in
that paper to replicate the equity-premium puzzle and to capture the history of US stock
prices.
I ﬁnd that the degree of insurance against national idiosyncratic shocks has improved
over time only for some countries and only if SDFs are estimated assuming time-varying
risk-aversion. Diﬀerent macro models are shown to have diﬀerent implications for interna-
tional risk. When SDFs are estimated relying on the assumptions of the standard macro
model (constant risk-aversion), I ﬁnd that nominal exchange rate volatility represented
an important source of macroeconomic risk, whose decrease led to a signiﬁcant reduction
in welfare losses from imperfect insurance. Thus when confronted with the data, standard
open-macro models imply that nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not contain wealth
divergences across countries. Instead, a reduction in nominal exchange rate volatility can
reduce substantially the risk to be shared internationally and increase global welfare. This
result bears interesting implications for the literature on optimal exchange rate regimes.
While in a well-know analysis Baxter and Stockman (1988) found that the only change
in the behaviour of macro aggregates caused by the adoption of a ﬁxed exchange rates
regime, is a reduction in exchange rate volatility, our results suggest that a fall in this
volatility can indeed reduce substantially cross-border risk-sharing ineﬃciencies.
When SDFs are estimated assuming time-varying risk-aversion, I ﬁnd that the fall in
the volatility of macro aggregates — mainly GDP of both the US and OECD countries,
and its components — have reduced signiﬁcantly contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciencies. The
Great Moderation, the lower GDP volatility experienced in the last decades by both the
US and most industrialized countries, seems to have increased global welfare by reducing
ineﬃciencies due to imperfect risk-sharing. Thus time-varying risk-aversion implies that
limiting welfare losses from imperfect risk-sharing requires reducing the volatility of macro
fundamentals.
This paper is related to Viani (2010) which questions the validity of the theoretical
eﬃciency condition for ﬁnancial markets at the basis of most empirical methods. The
present paper is the natural follow up of that analysis, as it investigates the implications
of those ﬁndings for empirical methods. This paper is also related to the vast literature
on empirical risk-sharing measurement. Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), Obstfeld
(1993), Brandt, Cochrane and Santa Clara (2006), and Flood, Marion and Matsumoto
(2008) are only a non-exhaustive list. Virtually all these methods are implicitly based on
the assumption of no relative price ﬂuctuations.
To my knowledge this paper is the ﬁrst one to assess the performance of existing em-
pirical methods using a simulated model, and to investigate the problems that can be
caused by the presence of relative price ﬂuctuations. It is also the ﬁrst one to propose
a theoretically-consistent measure of cross-border risk-sharing ineﬃciencies that gives an
indication of the welfare losses created by imperfect insurance and does not rely on re-
strictive assumptions about relative price movements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section studies the performance
of standard empirical methods through simulation analysis. Section 3 describes the new
method and its theoretical foundations, and assesses its performance in simulation exer-
cises. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 shows the results from applying
this method to the US and OECD countries. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
3GMM estimation also allows verifying that the functional form assumed is not rejected by the data.
42 Assessing the performance of standard methods
The purpose of this section is to investigate which problems can be caused to existing
empirical methods by the presence of relative price ﬂuctuations. I write a simple model
in which both relative price ﬂuctuations and ﬁnancial ﬂows can transfer purchasing power
across countries, and simulate it under three diﬀerent asset structures — Financial autarky,
trade in uncontingent bonds, and trade in two equities. The risk-sharing properties of
these asset trade regimes have been studied in Viani (2010). Financial autarky gives
less or equal insurance against national supply shocks than the other asset structures.
Trade in uncontingent bonds ranks second, while trade in two equities gives perfect risk-
sharing against national disturbances. I apply diﬀerent empirical methods to the simulated
model to check if they identify correctly full risk-sharing in the two-equities case, and if
they capture the correct ranking of insurance among asset structures. I report here the
results relative to the method of Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996). I use them
to illustrate the problems that can be caused to existing empirical frameworks by the
presence of relative price ﬂuctuations and by their interaction with cross-border ﬁnancial
ﬂows. Results from applying other methods (Obstfeld (1993), Brandt, Cochrane and
Santa Clara (2006), Flood, Marion and Matsumoto (2008)) are reported in Appendix A.
2.1 The model
The model is the two-country two-good DSGE framework with endowment shocks and
home bias in consumption studied in Viani (2010).4 Its core structure is the simplest one
that generates a general equilibrium interaction between the two channels of international
insurance, relative price ﬂuctuations and cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows.
The model consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, each inhabited by a rep-
resentative household. Countries are specialized in the production of diﬀerent goods.
Households in country H receive utility from consuming a bundle made up of the foreign













where Cjt denotes consumption of the good produced in country j and δ is a parameter
capturing home bias in consumption. θ is the elasticity of substitution between H and
F-produced goods; in this model it coincides with the trade elasticity. The F consump-
tion bundle is analogously deﬁned. Starred variables denote the corresponding quantities
consumed by Foreign agents. Goods are freely tradable but not storable. The period
utility of both agents depends on current consumption only and is a Constant Relative
Risk Aversion function with risk aversion coeﬃcient ρ.
In each period H and F households receive a stochastic endowment according to the
process
log(Yjt)=ζ log(Yjt−1)+εjt
where Yjt denotes the endowment received by consumer j and εjt ∼ iid(0,σε).
I assume that the law of one price holds and that the nominal exchange rate is constant
and equal to one for simplicity. Due to home bias in consumption Purchasing Power Parity
does not hold outside a symmetric Steady State, and the two price indexes Pt and P 
t are
tied by the following condition deﬁning the real exchange rate Qt
4The model is closely related to frameworks employed in Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Kollmann (2006),









where Pht,a n dPft denote respectively the price of H and F-produced goods.













Analogous conditions hold for F agents. Good market clearing conditions read
Yht = Cht + C 
ht
Yft = Cft+ C 
ft
The model is loglinearized around a symmetric Steady State in which countries’ wealth
is assumed to be equalized, endogenous variables are constant and exogenous ones are
equal to their mean values.
I simulate the model under three diﬀerent asset trade regimes. Households’ budget
constraints are pinned down by the speciﬁc asset structure assumed.5
2.2 Asset structure 1: Financial autarky
Under Financial autarky relative price ﬂuctuations represent the only channel of cross-
border insurance. Households have no means of smoothing consumption over time and






Viani (2010) shows that in this model Financial autarky gives less or equal insurance
against national shocks than the other two asset trade regimes.
5In order to focus squarely on the problems caused to empirical methods by the presence of relative
price ﬂuctuations, we will abstract from the following issues, well-known to the insurance literature: taste
shocks, measurement errors, lack of capital gains/losses in National Accounts data, econometric issues
due to panel estimation.
62.3 Asset structure 2: Trade in uncontingent bonds
If agents can trade in uncontingent bonds paying 1 unit of the H consumption bundle in





− Ct + Bt
where Bt+1 denotes bonds purchased in period t, PB
t their unitary price in terms of the
H consumption bundle. Bonds are assumed to be in zero net supply. H households’
inter-temporal problem is given by
max
{Ct,Bt+1,νt}



























In the symmetric Steady State B = B  =0 .
Viani (2010) shows that trade in uncontingent bonds gives the second-best degree of
insurance among the three asset structures considered.
2.4 Asset structure 3: Trade in two equities (eﬀectively complete
markets)
Assume households can trade in two equities, H and F, representing respectively a claim
to the H and F country’s endowment. The total quantity of each equity is normalized
to 1. Sh, Sf, S∗
h,a n dS∗
f denote the fraction of H and F equities owned respectively by
H and F consumers. Due to the normalization, the owner of Sh equities receives a share
Sh of the H endowment. Equities real returns, expressed in terms of the H consumption










where Z and Z∗denote the real price (in terms of the H consumption bundle) of the two
assets.
The budget constraint of H households reads
NFAt = NFAt−1 +
YhtPht
Pt
− Ct + Rt · (Sht − 1) + R∗
tSft
where NFAt ≡ [(Sh,t+1 − 1) · Zt + Sf,t+1 · Z∗
t ] denotes H net foreign assets.































In the Steady State NFA= NFA  =0 .
As shown in Kollmann (2006) and Viani (2010), trade in two equities makes asset
markets eﬀectively complete and provides perfect risk-sharing.
2.5 Parametrization
I simulate the behaviour of the model for 1000 periods assuming the following parameter
values
Table 1: Model parametrization
H consumption home bias δ 0,9
F consumption home bias δ
  0,9
Hd i s c o u n tf a c t o r β 1/1.01
Fd i s c o u n tf a c t o r β
  1/1.01
Risk-aversion coeﬃcient ρ 2
H shocks persistence ζ 0,95
F shocks persistence ζ
  0,95
I also assume εt ∼ N (0,1), ε 
t ∼ N (0,1),a n dCov(εt,ε t)=0 .
2.6 The performance of empirical methods: Asdrubali, Sorensen
and Yosha (1996)
2.6.1 The methodology
The method of Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) (ASY henceforth) was originally
developed to estimate risk-sharing among US states. Yet most subsequent applications
used it to estimate cross-border insurance. The methodology assumes no relative prices
and relies on the following identity6
C = GDP + NFI− NSAV (2)
where NFI and NSAV denote respectively net ﬁnancial income and net savings. From
(2), full insurance — C and Y being uncorrelated, according to ASY — requires a country
experiencing a negative output shock (getting poorer absent asset trade) to receive income
6Equation (2) implies that consumption and output have the same composition, hence the same price.
8from abroad (either from portfolio returns or from external borrowing — net of physical
capital accumulation). The method consists in estimating
ΔlogCt − ΔlogC 
t = α + β · (logYt − logY  
t )+εt (3)
where Δ denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence of a variable and β is interpreted as a measure of the
uninsured eﬀects on consumption of GDP ﬂuctuations.
Moreover ASY show that the decomposition in (2) allows to quantify the fraction of
output shocks that is absorbed through diﬀerent channels of insurance by panel estimating
−ΔlogNFIt ≡ (ΔlogGDPt − ΔlogGNPt)=αf,t + βf · ΔlogGDPt + εft (4)
ΔlogNSAVt ≡ (ΔlogGNPt − ΔlogCt)=αs,t + βs · ΔlogGDPt + εst
ΔlogCt = αu,t + βu · ΔlogGDPt + εut
where βf is interpreted as the fraction of output shock that is absorbed through factor
income ﬂows, βs is the share absorbed through consumption smoothing, and βu the
fraction left uninsured. Time ﬁxed eﬀects in (4) are meant to capture the eﬀects of
aggregate shocks. In an OLS framework, we can replace time ﬁxed eﬀects by adding
Foreign GDP as a regressor, and estimate
(ΔlogGDPt − ΔlogGNPt)=αf + βf · ΔlogGDPt + γf · logGDP 
t + εft (5)
(ΔlogGNPt − ΔlogCt)=αs + βs · ΔlogGDPt + γs · logGDP 
t + εst
ΔlogCt = αu + βu · ΔlogGDPt + γu · logGDP 
t + εut
Notice that under the maintained assumption of no relative prices, equations (5) imply
the same view of optimal ﬁnancial ﬂows underlying (2): eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets should
channel resources to the countries that (absent asset trade) would have been made rela-
tively poorer by national shocks. Slopes in the interval [0,1) are interpreted as a relatively
high degree of insurance. Instead, βu > 1, βf < 0,a n dβs < 0 indicate that ﬁnancial
markets are highly ineﬃcient. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004) estimate βf < 0 among Euro-
pean countries during the Nineties, and interpret this ﬁnding as signaling bad insurance
from cross-border ownership of securities.
A ﬁrst adjustment to account for price ﬂuctuations Since this method had
been originally developed to estimate risk-sharing among diﬀerent regions within a country
and abstracted completely from relative price movements, most studies estimating (3) and
(5) in an international setup implicitly modiﬁed identity (2) to account for international




+ NFI− NSAV (6)
where P and Py are respectively the prices of consumption and output, and net ﬁnancial
income and net savings are expressed in terms of real consumption. Thus most studies
deﬂate national output with the local CPI, so as to express all variables in terms of
9the country’s consumption.7 In all the estimations below I will assume this correction,
and deﬂate output using national CPIs. Appendix B discusses the consequences of not
implementing this change and shows the corresponding results.
Notice that by subtracting the national identities (6) relative to countries H and F we
can write their consumption diﬀerential as8
(ΔlogCt − ΔlogC )=( Δ l o g GDPt − ΔlogGDP 
t )+ωΔlogTOTt       
Δlogvt
−φΔlogNSAVt + κΔlogNFIt
where TOTt are country H terms of trade, ω, φ,a n dκ are positive constants, and νt is
the real relative value of the H and the F endowments. Thus, running (3) with properly
deﬂated output is equivalent to estimating
(ΔlogCt − ΔlogC )=α + β · Δlogvt + εt
The impact on consumption diﬀerentials of relative price ﬂuctuations is included in the
independent variable, νt. Therefore, according to the ASY method, we can interpret β as
t h ef r a c t i o no fs h o c k st h a ti snot insured through ﬁnancial markets.
2.6.2 Estimation results: The problems caused by relative price ﬂuctuations
Table 2: ASY method
OLS estimation of the fraction of shocks left uninsured
β (fraction uninsured) θ =0 .3 θ =0 .6 θ =1 .2
Financial autarky 1 1 1
Bond 1,74 1,190 0,73
Complete markets 1,75 1,191 0,72
Table 2 reports the estimation results for speciﬁcation (3). Standard errors are negli-
gible and are not reported. The estimation is carried out for three diﬀerent values of the
trade elasticity θ. It can be shown that in the present model these values correspond to
diﬀerent kinds of interactions between price ﬂuctuations and ﬁnancial ﬂows. For θ =0 .3
receiving a ﬁnancial inﬂow from abroad lowers the relative price of a country’s output
(prices and ﬂows are substitutes in providing insurance). For θ>0.3 the same transfer
raises the international price of a country’s output (the two insurance channels, ﬂows and
prices, are complements).9
7See for example Sorensen and Yosha (1998), Del Negro (2000), and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004).
Sorensen and Yosha (1998) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004) motivate the need for this adjustment.
8All aggregates are expressed in terms of Home consumption.
9See Viani (2010).
10The estimations identify correctly Financial autarky as the case in which ﬁnancial
markets do not absorb any fraction of national disturbances (β =1 ). Notice however
that in this model the absence of asset trade has a very diﬀerent impact on consumers’
welfare for diﬀerent values of the trade elasticity. Viani (2010) shows that under Financial
autarky cross-border insurance from relative price ﬂuctuations is very high for θ =1 .2,
while terms of trade movements enlarge the risk-sharing ineﬃciency that would have
aroused at constant prices for θ =0 .3.T h eβ coeﬃcients estimated by the ASY method
for the Financial autarky speciﬁcation do not give any indication of the welfare losses due
to the absence of ﬁnancial markets.
For θ =1 .2 the estimated coeﬃcients identify the correct ranking of insurance across
asset trade regimes (β
CM <β
B <β
FA). However, full insurance is rejected in the
speciﬁcation with complete markets — more than 70% of the shocks is estimated to be left
uninsured. For θ =0 .6 and θ =0 .3 estimating (3) leads to reject the null of full insurance
in the complete markets case. Moreover the coeﬃcients do not even identify the correct
ranking of insurance across asset structures. The coeﬃcients estimated for the bond and
the complete markets case exceed unity, signaling worse insurance than under Financial
autarky.
Notice that from an econometric point of view all the coeﬃcients are estimated cor-
rectly. The failure to identify full risk-sharing and the correct ranking of insurance reﬂects
the following issues, which concern the interpretation of regression (3)
Issue 1: The consumption allocation corresponding to full risk-sharing de-
pends on relative prices According to the ASY method, an allocation delivers full
insurance if consumption diﬀerentials and GDP diﬀerentials are uncorrelated. However
from a theoretical point of view, when relative prices are well-deﬁned, consumption and
GDP diﬀerential may well be correlated in the full risk-sharing allocation. Macroeco-
nomic theory suggests that with full insurance agents’ Stochastic Discount Factors should
be equalized at any time. Viani (2010) shows that in the present model this condition
implies that the allocation achieved in an equilibrium with complete asset markets, should











where UC and U 
C denote respectively the marginal utility of consumption in the H and
the F country, and RER is the real exchange rate between the two currencies. In terms
of growth rates, and assuming CRRA utility function with risk-aversion parameter ρ
ΔlogRER = ρ · (ΔlogCt − ΔlogC 
t )
In the full insurance allocation consumption in the Home country can fall in response to
a negative income shock, provided H consumers are compensated by an appreciation of
their currency. The benchmark of risk-sharing underlying equation (3) does not take into
account the role played by relative prices in characterizing the full insurance allocation.
This is why the ASY method estimates β  =0even in the model with complete asset
markets.
Issue 2: The relative value of endowments does not reﬂect relative wealth
eﬀects The ASY method regresses consumption diﬀerentials on the relative value of
endowments. The presumption is that an increase in the relative value of the H endow-
ment (the Home country getting relatively richer in equilibrium) should be followed by a
ﬁnancial transfer to the Foreign country if ﬁnancial markets foster insurance. However,
the relative value of endowments does not necessarily indicate which country is made
11relatively poorer by national shocks. It is possible to show that for θ =0 .6 an increase in
the Home endowment raises its relative value under any asset trade regime. But due to
a strong terms of trade depreciation, the shock would make Home consumers relatively
poorer absent asset trade.10 Thus, when trade in assets is introduced, a rise in the Home
endowment is optimally followed by a transfer of ﬁnancial resources to this country, both
in the model with trade in two equities and with trade in bonds. For θ =0 .6 estimating
β>1 (and a larger β in the case of complete markets) reﬂects resources ﬂowing to the
Home country after an increase in the value of its GDP. Contrary to the interpretation
of ASY, these ﬂows are optimal and signal a high degree of insurance. What the method
does not consider is that the relative value of endowments does not reﬂect relative wealth
eﬀects.
Issue 3: Eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets may channel resources “upstream” It
can be proved that when ﬂows and prices are substitutes (when they channel purchasing
power in opposite directions) risk-sharing requires ﬁnancial markets to channel resources
to countries that (absent asset trade) would be made relatively richer by national shocks.
This happens in our model for θ =0 .3.11 An increase in the relative value of the H
endowment would make the Home country richer absent asset trade. Since ﬂows and prices
are substitutes, after the shock eﬃcient ﬁnancial ﬂows channel resources “upstream”, to
the Home country, both in the model with trade in two equities and with trade in bonds.
Estimating β>1 in (3) indicates precisely “upstream” ﬂows. Contrary to the standard
interpretation of ASY, however, β>1 corresponds to a high degree of insurance — perfect
in the case of trade in two equities.
Table 3 reports the results from estimating speciﬁcation (5). In the case of trade in
two equities, full insurance is achieved through net factor income ﬂows. The estimations
should then ﬁnd βf =1for all the values of the trade elasticity. For θ =1 .2 the estimation
rejects full insurance through net factor income ﬂows, but signals that a (small) share of
supply shocks is absorbed through this insurance channel (β>0). For θ =0 .6 and θ =0 .3,
the estimation signals negative insurance from cross-border ownership of securities. We
ﬁnd similar results when estimating the share of shocks absorbed through consumption
smoothing in the model with trade in uncontingent bonds.12 The issues behind these
results are the same discussed above.
2.6.3 Summarizing
Checking the performance of the ASY method in a model with relative price ﬂuctuations
has unveiled three issues that may aﬀect this methodology. First, the relative value of
endowments used as a regressor does not necessarily identify which country is made rel-
atively richer/poorer by national shocks. Second, the interaction between relative prices
and ﬁnancial ﬂows may require eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets to channel resources “upstream”,
to relatively richer countries. Finally, the eﬃcient consumption allocation can be char-
acterized only in conjuncture with relative price movements: with full insurance national
consumption can fall after a negative income shock, provided consumers are compensated
by an appreciation of their currency — a condition that is not considered by the ASY
10See Viani (2010) for a formal proof. θ =0 .6 corresponds to ˜ τ<θ<˜ η in the notation of that paper.
In this region of the trade elasticity domain, under Financial autarky an increase in the H endowment
raises the shadow value of Home current income above the shadow value of Foreign current income — the
shock makes the H consumer relatively poorer.
11See Viani (2010) for a formal proof. θ =0 .3 corresponds to θ<˜ τ in that paper.
12The estimation signals (correctly) that no fraction of the shocks is absorbed through smoothing in
the complete markets case. Clearly, estimating the share of shocks that is left uninsured yields the same
r e s u l t sa sf o rs p e c i ﬁ c a t i o n( 3 ) .
12Table 3: ASY method
OLS estimation of shares absorbed through diﬀerent channels
βf( s h a r ea b s o r b e dv i aN F I ) θ =0 .3 θ =0 .6 θ =1 .2
Financial autarky / / /
B o n d ///
Complete markets -0,38 -0,09 0,14
βs( s h a r ea b s o r b e dv i aN S A V )
Financial autarky / / /
Bond -0,37 -0,09 0,13
Complete markets 0 0 0
βu (share uninsured)
Financial autarky 1 1 1
Bond 1,37 1,095 0,863
Complete markets 1,38 1,0952 0,862
13benchmark of eﬃciency. These problems can have potentially severe consequences. Not
only they lead to reject full insurance also when the “true” model features eﬀectively
complete asset markets, but they can also lead to estimate a higher degree of insurance
under, say, Financial autarky than in the case of complete markets.
In a world in which relative price ﬂuctuations are large and sustained and contribute
to transfer purchasing power across countries, the benchmarks of eﬃciency derived in
one-good frameworks and on which standard methods are based, do not seem to be valid
anymore. Looking at the correlation between relative consumption and relative output,
that is focusing on the pattern of ﬁnancial ﬂows across countries as required by the ASY
approach and most existing empirical methods, may then be easily misleading.
3 An insurance benchmark from macro theory
In this section I derive a measure of cross-border insurance valid also in presence of relative
price ﬂuctuations. This measure provides the theoretical foundations for a new empirical
method to estimate cross-border risk-sharing. I apply the new method to the simulated
model of section 2 in order to compare it with previous methodologies.
3.1 A measure of cross-border insurance
Assume the world consists of several countries, each inhabited by a representative agent.
Asset markets are complete as agents can trade internationally in a full set of Arrow-
Debreu securities. Focus on two countries, Home and Foreign. In what follows W (s |s)
denotes the price in state-of-the-world s of an Arrow-Debreu security paying 1 unit of
some numéraire good in the following period if state-of-the-world s  realizes. UC (s) and
UC (s |s) are the marginal utilities of consumption of the H consumer, respectively, in
state s a n di ns t a t es . P (s) and P (s |s) are the prices of the H consumption good in
state s and s . β denotes the discount factor of the H consumer, π (s |s) the conditional
probability of state s  given s. The Euler Equation of the H consumer, regulating her









The H consumer buys securities until the marginal cost of purchasing one more asset (left
hand side in equation (7)) equals its expected marginal beneﬁt (right hand side).
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,∀s,s  (8)
where starred variables denote Foreign aggregates, and ω is the nominal exchange rate
between H and F currencies.
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where m(s |s) and m  (s |s) are the Stochastic Discount Factors (SDFs) of the H and the
F consumer. Perfect cross-border risk-sharing against national income shocks (given by
construction by complete asset markets) equates the SDFs of the two agents, for every
14states-of-the-world s and s . Equivalently, in terms of time-dependent notation, perfect
risk-sharing implies
mt = m 
t,∀t (9)
If countries cannot pool risk eﬃciently the SDFs m and m  need not be equalized:
uninsurable shocks will drive a wedge between them in some states of the world. Therefore
mt = ηt · m 
t (10)
where ηt represents the wedge between H and F SDFs created by uninsurable disturbances.
Taking logarithms on both sides of (10) I deﬁne the measure of cross-border insurance,
the gap,a s
gapt ≡ (logηt − log1) = logmt − logm 
t (11)
gapt measures the percentual deviation of the wedge between H and F SDFs observed at
time t from the wedge that would be observed if income risk was perfectly shared (i.e.
if η was equal to 1). Therefore, by construction gapt measures the percentual deviation
from full insurance against income ﬂuctuations observed at time t.
Appendix C shows that assuming frictionless trade in uncontingent bonds equalizes







⇒ Et (gapt+1)=0 (12)
It is well-known that if income risk is perfectly shared countries’ relative wealth should
stay constant over time. Using a simple two-country two-good DSGE model and follow-
ing closely Viani (2010), Appendix C proves that the gap measures changes in countries’
relative wealth created by uninsurable shocks. If consumers in diﬀerent countries can-
not fully insure against national shocks, idiosyncratic disturbances change their relative
wealth. The sign of the gap arising in response to shocks indicates the new ranking of
wealth, that is which country has been made relatively richer (poorer) by the shock. Its
magnitude quantiﬁes the change in countries’ relative wealth.
Moreover, there exists a monotone relationship between the gap and the social welfare
losses due to lack of insurance. I prove in Appendix D that the higher the gap that opens
up at time t the higher the deviation of the time-t allocation from the optimum of a social
welfare function that weights the two countries according to their previous wealth. More
speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst-best plan is an (inﬁnite) sequence of allocations engineered by a Social
Planner who aims at keeping ﬁxed relative countries’ wealth from t =0up to t = ∞,
weighting countries according to their t = −1 relative wealth. If countries’ relative wealth
has been constant until time (t − 1),t h egap that opens up at time t reﬂects deviations
from this ﬁrst-best allocation. If countries’ relative wealth has changed between t = −1
and (t − 1) the gap that opens up at time t reﬂects deviations from the second-best plan
that would be implemented by a Social Planner who, given the previous deviation from
the ﬁrst-best plan, re-optimizes taking into account the new level of relative wealth. In
both cases, the gap maps monotonically into social welfare losses due to imperfect risk-
sharing.13
13This holds under the maintained assumption that deviations from the law of one price are contained.
153.2 A new empirical method
Every deviation of the gap from zero measures a percentual deviation from full risk-sharing
that may result in welfare losses, and is contingent on the shocks that hit the economies
at each point in time. This measure of insurance provides the theoretical foundations for
a new empirical method to estimate cross-border risk-sharing. The method consists in
estimating the contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency between two countries by using some
statistic that quantiﬁes the volatility of the gap computed on their Stochastic Discount
Factors around zero, within a certain time horizon. The next section shows in detail
how this method can be brought to the data, by estimating the deep parameters that
characterize the SDFs and by testing the validity in the data of important assumptions.
For the moment, we will assume that we know the “true” functional form of the SDFs of
the countries under consideration. We will also assume that the data do not reject the






Then the unconditional mean of the gap (the log diﬀerence between SDFs) is equal to zero
(see equation (12)). Therefore, the variance and the standard deviation of the gap can be
used as measures of its volatility around zero, i.e. measures of the contingent risk-sharing
ineﬃciency between the two countries over a certain period of time.
While the variance of the gap quantiﬁes the risk-sharing ineﬃciency, this measure is
silent about its causes. It does not indicate which are the sources of idiosyncratic risk
against which countries are not fully insured. Moreover a high variance could be due
either to the high frequency and strength of uninsurable shocks, or to a low degree of
insurance against macro risk. In order to disentangle these eﬀects and to study which
sources of macroeconomic risk are left uninsured among two countries, we can regress the
time-series for the gap on diﬀerent sources of risk. Assuming there are only productivity
disturbances, as in our DSGE model, we can run
gapt = α + β · ΔlogYt + γ · ΔlogY  
t + εt (13)
where Δ denotes ﬁrst diﬀerences. The regressors capture the sources of macroeconomic
risk that country H and F should ideally pool. The coeﬃcient associated with each shock
quantiﬁes the percentual deviation from full risk-sharing that is created by a 1% variation
in the corresponding macro aggregate, thus proxying for the degree of insurance against
that particular source of risk. The lower the coeﬃcient estimated, say, for country H GDP
growth, the higher the degree of insurance against this source of risk. We can assess if
some sources of risk are perfectly pooled by testing whether the corresponding coeﬃcient
equals zero. We can also estimate (13) over two distinct time periods and decompose
changes in the variance of the gap over time into changes in the coeﬃcients and changes
in the variance of the regressors. This allows to attribute reductions in the risk-sharing
ineﬃciency either to reductions in the extent of macro risk to be pooled (the variance
of regressors) or to increases in the degree of insurance against diﬀerent sources of risk
(reductions in the coeﬃcients).14
14A rise in the degree of insurance against some disturbances could be due to three factors. First, an
improvement in insurance possibilities to share risk across countries, e.g. an enlargement in the set of
ﬁnancial instruments traded internationally. Second, some other structural change in a shock process that
makes the available set of assets more suitable to pool this speciﬁc source of risk across countries. For
instance, two countries that can trade only in one uncontingent bond can self-insure against idiosyncratic
risk quite eﬃciently if shocks are temporary. If disturbances are permanent, the same asset structure does
not allow to insure against any share of risk (see Viani (2010)). Finally, a rise in the degree of insurance
16A note on the choice of deﬂators Combining H and F budget constraints, it is
easy to see that the gap can be expressed as
ΔlogQt − ρ(ΔlogCt − ΔlogC 
t )=−μ(ΔlogGDPt − ΔlogGDP 
t )+ωΔlogTOTt       
Δlogvt
+φΔlogNSAVt − κΔlogNFIt +Δl o gQt
where TOTt are country H terms of trade, μ, ω, φ,a n dκ are positive constants, and νt
is the real relative value of the H and the F endowments. Thus, we have two options for
estimating equation (13). We can either deﬂate output using the national CPIs or GDP
deﬂators.15 If we choose the former, running (13) is equivalent to estimating
gapt = α + β · (ΔlogYt +Δl o gTOTt)+γ · (ΔlogY  
t +Δl o gTOTt)+εt
The regressors include the impact of terms of trade ﬂuctuations on the relative value
of endowments. Thus the coeﬃcients proxy for the degree of insurance against GDP
risk, abstracting from the insurance provided by relative price ﬂuctuations that aﬀect
the relative value of endowments. Notice that this adjustment is not enough to clear
completely the coeﬃcients from the eﬀects of price ﬂuctuations, which enter (13) through
real exchange rate movements.
Instead, if we deﬂate output using its own deﬂator, running (13) is equivalent to
estimating
gapt = α + β · (ΔlogYt)+γ · (ΔlogY  
t )+εt
The coeﬃcients proxy for the degree of insurance provided both by ﬁnancial markets and
relative price ﬂuctuations. In this paper I choose this second solution — using national GDP
deﬂators. The reason is the following. Recent contributions to the open-macro literature
(see for instance Corsetti et al. (2008)) emphasize that the structure of ﬁnancial markets
can inﬂuence the insurance properties of relative prices. In this sense, the impact on
cross-border insurance of ﬁnancial market integration may encompass also improvements
in the insurance properties of relative prices, which should be included in our measure of
the degree of insurance.16
3.3 The new method in simulations
I apply the new method to the simulated model to check if it identiﬁes correctly full risk-
sharing in the two-equity case, and if it captures the correct ranking of insurance among
asset structures. Table 4 compares our measure of the bilateral risk-sharing ineﬃciency
(the standard deviation of the gap), across diﬀerent asset structures and values of the
trade elasticity. For the Financial autarky case, this statistic signals correctly a high
cross-border insurance from relative price ﬂuctuations for θ =1 .2, and a low degree of
could be due to an increase in the insurance properties of relative price ﬂuctuations, either brought about
by stronger ﬁnancial deepness or not.
15Notice that, from a purely theoretical point of view, deﬂating output with GDP deﬂators is not
entirely correct in the other methods (for instance in the approach of Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha
(1996)). Since these empirical frameworks are based on an identity, using GDP deﬂators is equivalent to
assuming no relative price ﬂuctuations (see section 2).
16Simulations carried out in our simple model (available upon request) show that the diﬀerence between
the coeﬃcients estimated using GDP and CPI deﬂators reveals whether relative price movements reduce
or amplify the wealth divergence that would arise at constant prices. The implementation of this exercise
if left for future research.
17insurance from terms of trade movements for θ =0 .3. Thus, contrary to the coeﬃcients
estimated through some of the standard methods, the standard deviation of the gap gives
an indication of the welfare losses due to the absence of ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, the
standard deviation of the gap reﬂects the correct ranking of insurance among diﬀerent
asset trade regimes, and leads to a non-rejection of full insurance in the complete markets
case.
Table 4: Gap standard deviation
G a ps t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n θ =0 .3 θ =0 .6 θ =1 .2
Financial autarky 12,89 4,51 2,24
Bond 0,09 0,03 0,02
Complete markets 0 0 0
Table 5 shows the OLS coeﬃcients estimated by running (13). Since the model is fully
symmetric β = −γ. Standard errors are negligible and are not reported. The magnitude
of the coeﬃcients reﬂects the degree of insurance against national shocks (the lower the
coeﬃcient, the higher the degree of insurance), their sign indicates which country is made
relative richer/poorer by the disturbances. Namely β<0( > 0) indicates that an increase
in the growth rate of Home GDP makes Foreign consumers relatively poorer (richer) (see
the interpretation of the gap outlined above).
Table 5: Deviation from full risk-sharing due to
a 1 percent increase in H GDP growth rate
β=—γθ =0 .3 θ =0 .6 θ =1 .2
Financial autarky -6,61 2,28 -1,11
Bond -0,03 0,011 -0,005
Complete markets 0 0 0
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Estimating Stochastic Discount Factors
The only assumptions we need to make to implement our method are the existence of a
representative agent in each country, and the speciﬁc form of the SDFs. In this paper
I adopt two strategies to estimate SDFs. First, I rely on the assumptions of standard
18open-macro models and postulate a constant risk-aversion; I estimate from the data the
deep parameters characterizing the SDFs, and verify that the functional form assumed is
not rejected by the data. Second, given the uncertainty on the speciﬁc form of the SDFs, I
follow Campbell and Cochrane assuming a utility function with time-varying risk-aversion;
I adopt the parametrization that was used in this work to replicate the equity-premium
puzzle and to capture the history of US stock prices.
4.1.1 Stochastic Discount Factors from the traditional open-macro model
In accordance with what is assumed by most models of international interdependence,
I assume that for all countries the period utility function is separable in consumption







where ρ is the (common) coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion and the utility function is
allowed to depend on other variables (κ) that do not enter the marginal utility of con-






















j denote the discount factors. In accordance with the literature, the
deep parameters appearing in this formula can be estimated from the data by testing the
























































where Si,j is the bilateral nominal exchange rate. This estimation allows to pin down ρ






. Moreover, if (16) is not rejected, the mean of the
gap cannot be rejected to be zero. Therefore, the variance and the standard deviation of
gapi,j can be conveniently used as measures of its volatility around zero, i.e. measures of
the contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency over a period of time.17 Notice also that failure to
reject equation (16) implies that the data do not reject our assumption about the speciﬁc
form of SDFs.
17In the application of this methodology to the US and OECD countries that is described in the next
section, equation (16) was not rejected. Clearly, if (16) was rejected we could still use the second raw
moment of the gap to quantify its volatility around zero over a certain period of time, but the validity of
the estimated ρ would be questionable.
194.1.2 Stochastic Discount Factors with time-varying risk-aversion
The second strategy consists in assuming a functional form for SDFs following the litera-
ture on habit formation, in particular Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The period utility
function depends on a stock of habit, and relative risk-aversion is time-varying and state-
dependent. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) show that a standard model featuring this
SDF solves the short and long-run equity premium puzzle, and captures much of the his-
tory of US stock prices. Rabitsch (2008) shows that the same preferences give a rationale
for deviations from uncovered interest parity and match the volatility of exchange rates





where Xt is the habit level. The relationship between consumption and habit is captured




Thus relative risk aversion (the local curvature of the utility function) is state-dependent
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The gap is given by
gapt ≡ log(mt) − log(m 
t)= (18)
ΔlogQt − ρ(ΔlogCt − ΔlogC 
t +Δl o gSt − ΔlogS 
t )
For each country I compute G as the average growth rate of national consumption
from the data. Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Rabitsch (2008), I assume
ρ =2 , φ =0 .985,a n dB = −0.01.
204.2 Estimating the risk-sharing ineﬃciency
Having checked for both speciﬁcations of SDFs that the mean of the gap cannot be
rejected to be zero in the data, I use its variance and standard deviation as measures of
its volatility around zero. The contingent ineﬃciency between country i and j over the




















4.3 Detecting signiﬁcant changes in the ineﬃciency over time
Signiﬁcant variations in the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between country i and j can be found
by testing for structural changes in the variance of gapi,j. Since the dates of potential
changes are unknown, I ﬁnd it convenient to employ the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
methodology of Qu and Perron (2007), which allows to detect structural breaks at un-
known dates, ﬁnd their number, and test for their signiﬁcance. More precisely, I estimate
gap
i,j
t = μ + εt (19)
where μ is a constant and εt are i.i.d. Normal disturbances. I assume no break occurred
in μ, and test for structural breaks in the variance-covariance matrix of errors.19
4.4 Macroeconomic risk versus degree of insurance
Following the same reasoning as for equation (13), if the relationship between country i
and j was described by a model with exogenous GDP, government spending and monetary
shocks, plus disturbances coming from currency speculation and from productivity in the
rest of the world, it is easy to show that the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between country i
and j would follow — in a ﬁrst order approximation to the model — the following process
gap
i,j
t = α · Δloggdpi
t + β · Δloggdp
j




t + η · Δlogs
i,j
t + ζ · Δloggdpworld





t denote respectively the growth rate of country
i,c o u n t r yj and “rest of the world” GDP, deﬂated through national GDP deﬂators and
not including government expenditure.20 Rest of the world GDP aﬀects the ineﬃciency
between country i and j as long as it has an asymmetric impact on consumption in





t are country i and country j
ﬁnal government expenditure expressed in local currency, and the nominal exchange rate
between country i and country j currency. Nominal exchange rate growth is capturing
both the eﬀects of monetary shocks and the impact of possible disturbances coming from
currency speculation. I use OECD GDP growth as a proxy for rest of the world GDP.
18I will use the standard deviation to compare the extent of the ineﬃciency across countries, and the
variance to detect changes in the ineﬃciency over time and to investigate their causes.
19See Qu and Perron (2007) for additional details on the tests.
20Equation (20) could also include lags of the independent variables as regressors.
21For instance, if a shock to Italian GDP had an asymmetric impact on the US and the UK, it would
contribute to determine gapUS,UK. Including rest of the world GDP as a regressor captures this eﬀect,
reducing the potential omitted-variable bias. Clearly Δloggdpworld does not include country i and
country j’s GDP.
21I estimate equation (20) instrumenting nominal exchange rate growth with GDP and
exchange rate growth lagged values.22
Two kinds of analyses can be performed using (20). First we can establish if some
sources of risk are perfectly pooled by testing whether the corresponding coeﬃcients equal
zero. Second, we can run (20) over two distinct time horizons in order to attribute changes
in the variance of the gap over time to changes in the coeﬃcients (the degree of insurance
against shocks) and changes in the variance of regressors (the extent of macroeconomic
risk to be pooled), according to the following procedure. First, any reduction in the
variance of gapi,j between the two subperiods pre and post (denoting the pre and post-
break years) can be expressed in terms of changes in the variance of shocks and changes




























































where the subscripts denote the pre and post-break years, and ˆ αpre and ˆ αpost are the
coeﬃcient on country i GDP estimated on the two subsamples. Second, based on the




to changes in each coeﬃcient and in the variance of each shock. For instance, the share
of the reduction in the variance of gapi,j across the two periods that is due to changes in
α is given by
share(α)=
V (α)
Va r(gapi,j)post − Va r(gapi,j)pre
(22)
where V (α) is the reduction in Va r
 
gapi,j 
explained by a fall in α (see Appendix E for
details on its computation). share(α) can be interpreted as the share of the reduction in
the contingent ineﬃciency due to better insurance against country i GDP risk.
Analogously we can compute the fraction of the change in Va r
 
gapi,j 
due to a fall














is the reduction in the variance of the gap explained by a fall in the
volatility of country i GDP across the two subsamples.
5 Risk-sharing among the US and OECD countries
The new methodology is applied to estimate the bilateral risk-sharing ineﬃciency between
the US and industrialized OECD countries and to study its evolution over time.
22Lags 1-3 or 3 only depending on the SDFs speciﬁcation. I use Instrumental Variables as there could
be other macro aggregates omitted in the regression that aﬀect both the gap and the regressors. This
problem is most likely to be relevant for a relative price, the nominal exchange rate, whose volatility is
larger in the data and (partially) unexplained by fundamentals. Also a constant, not reported in the
tables, was included in the regression.
22Sample and data The US is the reference country, the partner countries are
16 OECD industrialized economies: 4 extra-EU countries (Australia, Canada, Japan,
and New Zealand), 8 Euro-Area countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), and 4 European countries that did not join the Euro
(Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK).23 The data are sampled at the quarterly
frequency. Data on ﬁnal consumption expenditure, consumption deﬂators, nominal ex-
change rates, government ﬁnal consumption expenditure, and GDP, are from the OECD
Economic Outlook. Data on population at the annual frequency were obtained from the
OECD National Accounts. The period under consideration is 1970:2-2008:2.
5.1 SDFs from the traditional model: nominal exchange rate
volatility as a source of risk
Deep parameters estimation Assume CRRA utility function according to (14).
Following Dedola and De Fiore (2005), I tested equation (16) simultaneously for all partner
countries vis-a-vis the US through non-linear GMM.24 I used as instruments for each
equation a constant, lags 1 and 2 of consumption factor growth of the US and partner
country j, US and country j inﬂation, and nominal depreciation of the US dollar.
Table 10 in Appendix F shows the results. Although in the speciﬁcation of the SDFs
we do not allow for taste shocks, the model seems to capture well the data, consistently
w i t ht h er e s u l t so fp r e v i o u sG M Me s t i m a t i o n so ft h es a m ee q u a t i o n . 25 The p-value of the
J statistic indicates that the model cannot be rejected. The relative discount factors of






cannot be rejected to be equal to 1 for all partner countries.
The common coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion is estimated to be 1.32, well in the range
of estimates derived in previous studies.26
23Some OECD-members were not included in the sample because of data availability.
24I use continously-updated GMM and employ the Newey-West adjustment for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. Given the interdependence between countries, it is more eﬃcient to test the equations
for all partners simultaneously. Testing each equation individually, though, did not lead to reject the
model, consistently with the ﬁndings of Kollmann (1995).
The coeﬃcient of risk-aversion is assumed to be the same for all countries. I found that, when assuming
a diﬀerent ρ for each partner, the model cannot be rejected, but some of the coeﬃcients are estimated
very imprecisely and are not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant are all between zero and 2.
Therefore, since the main goals of the GMM estimation implemented here are (1) to establish whether
the model can be rejected and (2) to estimate risk-aversion, this coeﬃcient is assumed to be the same
for all countries, which leads (again) not to reject the model and yields signiﬁcant estimates for all the
parameters. It should be noted that the common ρ estimated this way is in the range of the signiﬁcant
ones estimated assuming diﬀerent risk-aversion coeﬃcients for each country.
25See, for instance, the results of Kollmann (1995) for several pairs of OECD economies, and Dedola
and De Fiore (2005) for European countries vis-a-vis Germany. These results are robust to the inclusion
of one additional instrument lag. I have chosen a reduced set of instruments in order to minimise the
potential bias that could stem from the excess of overidentifying restrictions in small samples.
26Stock and Wright (2000) show that when esimating risk-aversion inside a country (by using the
traditional CAPM Euler Equation and national panel data), the estimated coeﬃcient may be very low
because of a weak instrument problem. It should be noticed, however, that cross-country estimations of
the same equation tend to ﬁnd low values for the the CRRA, but seem to be immune from the weak-
instrument issue. Using non-linear GMM estimation and a cross-country version of the traditional CAPM
Euler Equation, Dedola and De Fiore (2005) estimate a common CRRA of 0.39 for Euro countries. Selaive
and Tuesta (2003) estimate the common CRRA of Australia and the US to be 1.58.B yu s i n gt h em e t h o d
of Stock and Wright (2000) to check for the presence of weak instruments, they establish that their result
is not driven by this potential problem. Corsetti and Dedola (2006) also test the cross-country version of
the traditional Euler equation through non-linear GMM and ﬁnd it cannot be rejected for many countries
vis-a-vis the US. They argue that testing the cross-country version of this equation may mitigate problems
due to measurement errors and to the presence of potential peso problems common to the two countries.
This might be the reason why the standard CAPM model is sometimes rejected in other studies that test
its one-country version.
23Although the risk-aversion coeﬃcient is estimated very precisely, the estimation might
not be immune from measurement errors in consumption and weak instrument issues.
Since this could bias downwards the estimation, robustness checks on all results have
been performed for higher values of this coeﬃcient (up to ρ =7 ) and are available upon
request.27
Contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency and its decrease over time Given these
results, for every partner country j in the sample I compute gap
US,j
t according to equation
(15), exploiting the equality of the estimated discount factors for the US and each partner
country (β
US = β
j,∀j). Since the GMM estimation of equation (16) did not reject the
equality of expected SDFs we can safely use the standard deviation (and the variance)
of gapUS,j as a measure of the contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and
country j.
Table 11 shows the standard deviation of gapUS,j for each partner country j,u s i n g
the ρ estimated from the data and other higher values. The estimated standard deviation
of the gap between the US and Canada (in the ﬁrst row) is statistically smaller than the
standard deviation of the gap between the US and any other partner country.28 Results
are robust to higher values of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient. Over the period 1970-2008 the
smallest contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency has been the one between the US and Canada.
Notice that this result could be due either to strong ﬁnancial linkages between the two
countries (a high degree of insurance via asset trade) or to a signiﬁcant synchronization
in their business cycles that could reduce the extent of purely idiosyncratic risk that the
two countries should pool.
Figures 1 and 2 graph the gap between the US and, respectively, the UK and the
Netherlands over the last forty years. The volatility of the gap between the US and these
countries seems to decrease from the mid-Nineties. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the
results of the structural break analysis to detect signiﬁcant changes in the variance of
the gap, reported in Table 12. For every partner country, I show the number of breaks
detected through the QML tests of Qu and Perron (2007), their dates, and the percentual
reduction in the ineﬃciency across the pre- and post-break period. Asterisks next to the
number of breaks indicate their signiﬁcance according to the test of no change versus a
number k of breaks.29
The only breaks in the variance that are found to be statistically signiﬁcant and robust
to all the values ρ are those estimated in 1992-1993 for several European countries, Italy,
27See Carroll (2001) for the downward bias due to measurement errors in consumption, and Stock and
Wright (2000) for weak instrument issues.
28I use a Wald test to establish whether this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. The test statistic is
W =[ r (b) − q] 

R(b) ˆ VR  (b)
−1
[r (b) − q] ∼ χ2 (1) (24)
where b is a vector of variances and covariances needed for the speciﬁc statistic, and r (b) is a function











and R(b)=∂r(b)/∂b . ˆ V is the variance-covariance matrix of b and is estimated employing the Newey-
West adjustment for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with a lag length of T1/4,w h e r eT is the
sample size. Results are reported in Table 3.4 where asterisks next to the standard deviation of each
gapUS,j indicate it is statistically diﬀerent from ˆ σ

gapUS,CAN	
. As usual, an asterisk indicates signiﬁ-
cance at the 10% level, two at the 5% level, and three at the 1% level.
29See Qu and Perron (2007). Additional details on the estimation— including the estimated variance
of errors before and after the breaks, and results for intermediate values of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient —
are available upon request. When computing the percentual reduction in the ineﬃciency, the pre-break
period is assumed to start in 1978 in order to get subsamples of similar length.
24the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Portugal, and Belgium.30 From the
early Nineties the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and these countries fell by 30
to 60%, depending on the partner. Figure 3 shows the rolling-window estimated standard
deviation of the gap and its trend for some selected partners, illustrating this fall in the
risk-sharing ineﬃciency.31
Macroeconomic risk vs degree of insurance I estimate equation (20) for the
pre and post-break periods (1978-1992 and 1993-2008) for the countries involved in the
1992-1993 break. Results are shown in Tables 13 and 14. Recall that each coeﬃcient
quantiﬁes the percentual deviation from full risk-sharing associated with a 1% variation
in the corresponding macro aggregate, and is therefore an inverse proxy for the degree of
insurance against that particular source of risk. Asterisks next to the coeﬃcients denote
their signiﬁcance computed using Newey-West adjusted standard errors with maximum
lag length 10. (·) symbols next to 1993-2008 coeﬃcients indicate that the coeﬃcient
changed signiﬁcantly over time, and show the level of signiﬁcance.32 The vast majority of
coeﬃcients are found to be signiﬁcant, signaling that perfect insurance against the main
sources of macro risk can be rejected in most of the cases. Only for some of the partner
countries there has been a signiﬁcant improvement in the degree of insurance against some
sources of risk.
Tables 15 and 16 report the shares of the reduction in the variance of the gap between
the pre and post-break period explained by falls in the variance-coviariance of shocks and
by changes in the coeﬃcients. Shares were computed according to (22) and (23) using only
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at the 10% level and variations in coeﬃcients over time
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Only for 3 countries out of 8 (the Netherlands, Spain, and
the UK) more than 20% of the reduction in the welfare losses from imperfect risk-sharing
can be attributed to improvements in the degree of insurance. For the other countries
involved in the 1992-1993 break, most of the reduction in the risk-sharing ineﬃciency vis-
a-vis the US was due to a decrease in nominal exchange rate volatility.33 Thus constant
risk-aversion implies that nominal exchange rate volatility does not foster an eﬃcient
allocation of resources across countries. It is rather an important source of macroeconomic
risk whose decrease led to a signiﬁcant reduction in insurance ineﬃciencies.
5.2 SDFs with time-varying risk-aversion: the eﬀects of the Great
Moderation
Contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency and its decrease over time Assume the
utility function with habits in (17). I adopt the parametrization of Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). Table 17 shows the standard deviation of gapUS,j for each partner country j.F o r
each partner the mean of the gap could not be rejected to be zero in the data.
Table 19 shows the results of the structural break analysis on the variance of the gap.
The risk-sharing ineﬃciency is found to decrease signiﬁcantly over time for all partner
countries but Ireland, Norway, and Portugal, for which signiﬁcant increases were detected.
The breaks seem to be clustered around two periods: last-Seventies/beginning-Eighties
and end of the Nineties. Their magnitude varies between 20 and 60%.F i g u r e4s h o w st h e
30A second break was detected for Italy, the Netherlands and Spain at the beginning of the Eighties,
but it was found not to be robust to slightly higher values of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient.
31The years indicated in the axes of the graphs correspond to the last year in each window. The series
are smoothed by HP-ﬁltering.
32As in Dedola and De Fiore (2005), the null ˆ αpre =ˆ αpost was tested separately on the outcomes of
the pre and post-break regressions. The post-break coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from the pre-break
one if and only if the null of equality is rejected by both tests.
33Also changes in the covariance of the regressors contribute to explain the reduction in the variance
of the gap. I report them in the tables only when their eﬀect is non-negligible.
25rolling-window estimated standard deviation of the gap and its trend for some selected
partners. The ineﬃciency between the US and, respectively, Switzerland and Belgium was
subject to two reductions, at the beginning of the Eighties and at the end of the Nineties.
The ineﬃciency relative to Italy and the Netherlands fell signiﬁcantly only at the end of
the Nineties.
Macroeconomic risk vs degree of insurance For the partner countries for which
a reduction in the ineﬃciency was detected, I estimate (20) for the pre- and post-break
period using as regressors also lagged values of the independent variables.34 Results are
shown in Tables 20 — 23. Perfect insurance against the main sources of macro risk can be
rejected in most of the cases. Half of the breaks are characterized by generalized falls in
the coeﬃcients, while the evidence is mixed for the remaining half.
Tables 24 and 25 report the shares of the reduction in the variance of the gap explained
by reductions in the volatility of shocks and by changes in the coeﬃcients. Half of the
reductions in insurance ineﬃciencies (the UK from 1984, Switzerland from 1983 and 1999,
the Netherlands from 1996, Finland from 1978, and Italy from 1998) were mostly due to
a higher degree of insurance against macro shocks. The other half of the reductions were
due to a fall in the volatility of macro aggregates, mainly GDP of both the US and the
partner countries, and its components. This is true for the breaks detected for Japan
in 1978 and 1997, Canada in 1997, the UK in 1999, and Belgium in 1983. Notice that
the beginning of a structural reduction in the volatility of US GDP (the beginning of
the so-called Great Moderation) has been usually set at 1984 by the empirical literature
on business-cycle ﬂuctuations. This is consistent with the reduction in the risk-sharing
ineﬃciency detected between the US and Belgium around 1983, which is found to be
largely driven by falls in the volatility of US GDP and government spending. Summers
(2005) ﬁnds that the Great Moderation began around the mid-Seventies in Japan, and
documents another drop in the volatility of Japanese GDP around 1997-1998. Structural
break analysis identiﬁes a signiﬁcant reduction in the variance of Canadian government
spending in 1997 (results are available upon request). The timing of these episodes of
reductions in macro volatility is consistent with the break-dates we estimate.
Thus time-varying risk-aversion implies that a reduction in the extent of risk to be
shared internationally, requires a decrease in the volatility of macro fundamentals, as the
one that occurred for several countries during the Great Moderation years.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the literature on empirical risk-sharing measurement by inves-
tigating in simulations the robustness of existing empirical methods to the presence of
international price ﬂuctuations. I also propose a new methodology to quantify interna-
tional insurance, which is valid also in presence of relative price movements, and apply it
to study the evolution of risk-sharing among industrialized countries. The main results
have been outlined in the main text and will not be repeated here. This section will
instead discuss some additional applications of this method, left for future research.
The empirical analysis carried out assuming constant risk-aversion unveiled that the
risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and some European economies fell from the early
34Using lagged values of the independent variables as regressors improves signiﬁcantly the results.
This is not surprising given that the risk-aversion coeﬃcients used to compute SDFs and gap are history-
dependent and thus embed the eﬀects of past shocks. The inclusion of lagged regressors was not necessary
in the case of constant risk-aversion.
In a few cases independent variables could explain only a small share of the variance of the gap.T h e s e
regressions are not reported.
26Nineties, mostly due to a decrease in nominal exchange rate volatility. The years 1992-
1993, in which the break in the contingent ineﬃciency is detected, coincide with the signing
of the Maastricht Treaty and with the end of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis
in Europe. Some of the partner countries for which the break was detected were directly
involved in the ERM crisis (namely, Sweden, the UK, and Italy). All partners involved in
the break (except Switzerland) signed the Maastricht Treaty, thus bounding themselves
to take part in the process of European integration and possibly to join the common
currency. The end of currency turmoils combined with strong expectations of exchange
rate stabilization might have been the factors driving the decrease in nominal exchange
rate volatility between the US and European countries. Whether the same events reduced
risk-sharing ineﬃciencies within European countries, and whether this results would be
robust to other SDFs speciﬁcations, is an interesting issue on which the method proposed
in this paper could shed light.
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Given any two countries, assume representative agents, no taste shocks, and CRRA utility













In a two-country environment, the method of Obstfeld (1993) consists in estimating
log(Ct)=l o g( C 
t )+l o g( C0/C 
0)+l o g( β/β
 )(t/ρ)
Assuming equal discount factors (as in our model) and diﬀerencing, we can estimate35
Δlog(Ct)=α + β · Δlog(C 
t )+γ · Δlog(Yt)+εt (25)
Markets are complete if β =1and γ =0 .
Using the simulated model described in section 2, I test equation (25) deﬂating national
output using local CPIs. The results are reported in Table 6. They are qualitatively similar
to those derived using the method of Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), and unveil
that Obstfeld’s framework is subject to the same issues due to the presence of relative
price ﬂuctuations.
A.2 Brandt, Cochrane and Santa Clara (2006)
Given any two countries, Brandt, Cochrane and Santa Clara (2006) propose the following
index of international risk-sharing



















μ =1is interpreted as perfect risk-sharing.
Table 7 reports the results from applying this method to our model. Full insurance is
rejected even in the model speciﬁcation in which asset markets are eﬀectively complete.
The reason is the following. According to this methodology the variance of Stochastic
Discount Factors expressed in local currencies (m and m ) represents the extent of risk to
be shared, and every deviation from Purchasing Power Parity is considered a manifestation
of the risk-sharing ineﬃciency. Viani (2010) shows however that an eﬃcient cross-border
allocation can be characterized only by relative consumption in conjuncture with relative
prices. In this sense, from a theoretical point of view not all price ﬂuctuations reﬂect a
departure from full risk-sharing.
35See Obstfeld (1993) for the need to carry out an estimation using ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data.
30Table 6: OLS estimation of β and γ in Obstfeld regression
β, γθ =0 .3 θ =0 .6
Financial autarky β =0 , γ =1 β =0 , γ =1
Bond β = −0,27, γ =1 ,27 β = −0,086, γ =1 ,086
Complete markets β = −0,273, γ =1 ,273 β = −0,087, γ =1 ,087
β, γθ =1 .2
Financial autarky β =0 , γ =1
Bond β =0 ,158, γ =0 ,841
Complete markets β =0 ,159, γ =0 ,84
Table 7: Risk-sharing index of Brandt, Cochrane and Santa Clara
μ (risk-sharing index) θ =0 .3 θ =0 .6 θ =1 .2
Financial autarky -0,13 -2,74 0,89
Bond 0,12 0,27 0,5
Complete markets 0,09 0,28 0,5
31A.3 Flood, Marion and Matsumoto (2008)
Flood, Marion and Matsumoto (2008) measure the risk-sharing ineﬃciency using the
variance of a country’s consumption on world consumption. In our setup this translates
to
λ = var(log(Ct) − log(Ct + C 
t ))
λ =0is interpreted as perfect risk-sharing.
Table 8 shows the results from applying this method to our simulated model. Clearly,
the benchmark of eﬃciency on which the methodology is based does not take into account
relative price ﬂuctuations, leading both to a rejection of full risk-sharing in the complete
markets case and to problems in capturing the correct ranking of insurance across asset
structures.
Table 8: Risk-sharing index of Flood, Marion and Matsumoto
λ (ineﬃciency index) θ =0 .3 θ =0 .6 θ =1 .2
Financial autarky 2 0,04 0,39
Bond 0,61 0,33 0,15
Complete markets 0,5 0,28 0,14
B A note on the use of GDP deﬂators
I apply the ASY method to our simulated model without implementing any correction
for the presence of relative price ﬂuctuations. Namely, I deﬂate output using national
GDP deﬂators. Results are shown in the following Table. In this case, the ASY method
is subject only to two of the three issues described in the main text.
The coeﬃcients estimated signal a higher degree of insurance under Financial Autarky
than under complete markets for θ =0 .6 because the relative value of endowments does
not reﬂect asymmetric wealth eﬀects. Full insurance is always rejected in the two-equity
model because the benchmark of risk-sharing on which the method is based does not
consider that the eﬃcient consumption allocation depends also on relative prices.
On the other hand, the method captures the correct ranking of insurance across asset
trade regimes for θ =0 .3. Contrary to the implementation that uses national CPIs to
deﬂate output, the present version of the method is not aﬀected by the third, typical issue
due to relative price ﬂuctuations — the fact that eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets may channel
resources “upstream”. This happens because the coeﬃcients estimated in this version
capture also the eﬀects of relative price ﬂuctuations on the relative value of endowments.
32Table 9: ASY method with GDP-deﬂated output
OLS estimation of the fraction of shocks left uninsured
β (fraction uninsured) θ =0 .3 θ =0 .6 θ =1 .2
Financial autarky 1,76 0,29 0,85
Bond 0,938 0,744 0,534
Complete markets 0,934 0,746 0,532
C Insurance measure and changes in relative wealth
Using the model outlined in section 2, I show that the gap reﬂects changes in countries’
relative wealth, for any asset structure we may assume in the model.
C.1 Changes in relative wealth under Financial autarky
First, let’s consider the Financial autarky case. Households have no means of smoothing
consumption over time and in each period their consumption must equal the value of their
income. H and F budget constraints read
CtPt = PhtYht C 
t P 
t = PftYft
Agents’ intra-temporal decision can be solved through a standard expenditure mini-








+ χt (PhtYht − PtCt),∀t
where χt is the multiplier attached to H agents’ budget constraints, and represents the
shadow value of current income, PhtYt. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to con-
sumption reads
(Ct)
−ρ = χtPt (26)
Its analogue for the F agent is given by
(C 
t )




  is the shadow value of F household’s current income.























36See for instance Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996).
33Δlog(Qt) − ρ(Δlog(Ct) − Δlog(C 
t )) = gapt = [Δlog(χt) − Δlog(χ 
t)]
where Δ denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence of a variable. The gap arising at time t in response
to country-speciﬁc shocks reﬂects asymmetric changes of the shadow value of income in
the two countries.37
C.2 Changes in relative wealth with trade in uncontingent bonds
Assume trade in uncontingent bonds. This amounts to modifying H household’s budget
constraint to
PB
t Bt+1 = PhtYht − PtCt + PtBt
where Bt+1 denotes bonds purchased in period t, PB
t their unitary price in terms of the
H consumption bundle. Bonds are assumed to be in zero net supply. H households’
inter-temporal problem is given by
max
{Ct,Bt+1,νt}
















vt represents the shadow value of income at time t.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt i m et income
equals the present discount value of wealth






t+j [Pt+jCt+j − Ph,t+jYt+j] ≡ PDV wealth
Hence, the multiplier νt is the shadow value of wealth at time t.
H agent’s ﬁrst order conditions are given by
(Ct)










From H agent’s ﬁrst order condition with respect to consumption and from its analogue
for the F consumer, we get
Δlog(Qt) − ρ(Δlog(Ct) − Δlog(C 
t )) = gapt = [Δlog(νt) − Δlog(ν 
t)] (30)
The gap arising at time t corresponds to asymmetric changes in the shadow value of
wealth in the two countries.38
37If H and F agents’ discount factors (the β s) were diﬀerent, the gap would reﬂect asymmetric wealth
eﬀects plus the (log) diﬀerence between the discount factors β and β 
gapt =[ Δl o g( χt) − Δlog(χ 
t)] + [log(β) − log(β )]
This shows that if agents are heterogeneous in the way they discount the future, for risk to be perfectly
shared their relative wealth should change at the rate [log(β) − log(β )].
38If β  = β , equation (30) would read
gapt =[ Δl o g( νt) − Δlog(ν 
t)] + [log(β) − log(β )]
34The proof above refers to a setup in which consumers can only smooth ex-post their
consumption. When agents can trade in contingent assets, gross portfolio holdings can
be used to hedge ex-ante against idiosyncratic risk: in response to any disturbance as-
sets’ return diﬀerentials deliver automatic transfers of wealth into consumers’ budget
constraints. Viani (2010) proves that if households can form an optimal portfolio that
hedges them ex-ante — to some extent — against shocks, the gap still represents asymmetric
changes in the shadow value of wealth in the two countries — the gap arising at time t
is still described by equation (30). In this case, the asymmetric wealth eﬀects mirrored
in [Δlog(νt) − Δlog(ν 
t)] are residual after portfolio returns have delivered contingent
transfers of income in households’ budget constraints.
D Insurance measure and welfare
The ﬁrst-best plan that delivers the maximum social welfare attainable in the workhorse
model can be characterized as the outcome of a Social Planner maximization. The Social
Planner must allocate consumption between the H and the F country, and that weights











































Yt = Cht + C 
ht (34)
Y  
t = Cft+ C 
ft (35)
In what follows μt and μ 
t denote the multipliers attached to the CES bundle constraints,
that is the shadow value of consumption, respectively, in the H and in the F country. In








corresponds to the real exchange rate Qt. The ﬁrst order conditions with
respect to Ct and C 
t read
Ω · (Ct)
−ρ = μt (36)
(1 − Ω) · (C 
t )
−ρ = μ 
t (37)
The sequence of equations (36) and (37) evaluated at t =0 ,...∞ characterize the allocation
that constitutes the ﬁrst-best plan that (by construction) delivers the maximum social
welfare attainable in this economy, that is the sequence of allocations that maximize
the Social Welfare function in (31). Equations (36) and (37) characterize the time t
allocation that is part of this plan. The ﬁrst-best allocations may coincide with the ones
attained in a decentralized model with complete asset markets. In particular, in order for
the Planner’s solution to correspond to a complete-markets decentralized allocation, the
Planner’s weights Ω and (1 − Ω) should represent countries’ relative wealth determined
35by the initial conditions C−1, C 
−1, μ−1,a n dμ 
−1, that is relative wealth at time t = −1.39
















where ωt and ω 
t denote the shadow value of wealth of the H and the F consumer at time
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Assume that countries’ relative wealth has always been constant from t = −1 until
time (t − 1) - i.e. assume the realized allocations have always coincided with the original


































Substituting these expressions into the ﬁrst order conditions (36) and (37) yields the





















In economies in which asset markets are incomplete the Planner’s ﬁrst order conditions
(36) and (37) need not hold with equality. Assume that the incomplete market allocations
have always coincided with the ﬁrst-best plan from t =0up to time (t − 1), but at
time t an idiosyncratic shock makes the incomplete market allocation deviate from the


























39See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
40The shadow value of wealth in (38) may equal the shadow value of current income or the shadow
value of the present discounted value of lifetime resources, depending on the asset structure assumed.
Equation (38), however, holds for every asset structure - even in a setup with multiple assets.
36where ϕ and ϕ  represent the wedge between marginal utility of consumption and CPI,











































Notice that if the shock is purely idiosyncratic, log(ϕt) and log(ϕ 
t) must have oppo-
site signs, that is if log(ϕt) is positive, log(ϕ 
t) must be negative and viceversa.41 The
incomplete markets gap coincides with the diﬀerence between log(ϕ 
t) and log(ϕt)



















The opposite sign of log(ϕ 
t) and log(ϕt) is suﬃcient to ensure that a higher gap (in ab-
solute value) must be generated by an incomplete markets allocation that implies higher
wedges between marginal utility of consumption and CPI, therefore a higher deviation
from the Social Planner’s (logged) optimality conditions (36) and (37). Due to the con-
cavity of the Social Welfare function in (31) as a sum of concave functions, a higher
deviation from the Social Planner’s focs maps into a lower social welfare. Therefore,
the higher the gap that arises in response to shocks in any incomplete markets setup,
the higher the loss in social welfare caused by the disturbance with respect to the full
risk-sharing Planner’s benchmark.
If countries’ relative wealth has changed between t = −1 and time (t − 1) the gap
that opens up at time t reﬂects deviations from the second-best plan that would be
implemented by a Social Planner who, given the previous deviation from the ﬁrst-best
plan, re-optimizes taking into account the new level of relative wealth.
Assume without loss of generality that only one deviation from the ﬁrst-best plan has
























subject to constraints (32)-(35) and to the initial conditions Cτ−1, C 
τ−1, μτ−1, μ 
τ−1.T h e
subscript (τ − 1) attached to the weights signals that relative weights are chosen so as to


































These characterize the benchmark time t allocation that delivers the maximum social
welfare attainable in this economy given initial conditions Cτ−1, C 
τ−1, μτ−1, μ 
τ−1, i.e.
the time t component of the second-best sequence of allocations that maximizes the Social
41I ft h i sw a sn o tt h ec a s eo n eo ft h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t sw o u l db ev i o l a t e d .
37Welfare function in (43). Following the same steps as above it’s easy to show that the
higher the gap arising in any incomplete markets setup at time t, the higher the deviation
from focs (39) and (40), that is the higher the social welfare loss due to imperfect risk-
sharing.
E Decomposing changes in the variance of the gap
The reduction in the variance of gapi,j explained by a fall in the coeﬃcient α, associated
with country i GDP growth, is computed as







































































where λ = β,γ,δ,η,ζ denote all other coeﬃcients in equation (20) and Lλ t h es o u r c eo f
shock with which each coeﬃcient λ is associated. The subscripts pre and post attached to
second moments denote the subperiod (pre- or post-break) for which they are computed.
The cross-product terms between the variation in the coeﬃcient and the change in the
variance are typically assumed to be negligible for small variations.
38F Figures and Tables













Figure 1 — Percentual deviations from full risk-sharing (gap) between the US and the UK












Figure 2 — Percentual deviations from full risk-sharing (gap) between the US and the
Netherlands










































































































































































Figure 3 — 10-years rolling-window estimates of the standard deviation of the gap for selected
partner countries (CRRA preferences). The series are smoothed by HP-ﬁltering.

































































Figure 4 — 10-years rolling-window estimates of the standard deviation of the gap for selected
partner countries (CC preferences). The series are smoothed by HP-ﬁltering.
41Table 10: Results from GMM estimation
Parameter Standard error P-value J-stat P-value
Risk-aversion coeﬃcient 1,32 0,0676 6,25E-085 1,709 1
Rel discount factor AUS 1,0025 0 0,0000
Rel discount factor CAN 1,0004 0,0009 0,0000
Rel discount factor FRA 1,0043 0,0015 0,0000
Rel discount factor ITA 1,0047 0,0017 0,0000
Rel discount factor JAP 1,0064 0,0015 0,0000
Rel discount factor NDL 1,0068 0,0017 0,0000
Rel discount factor ESP 1,0053 0,0016 0,0000
Rel discount factor SWE 1,0048 0,0020 0,0000
Rel discount factor CH 1,0102 0,0015 0,0000
Rel discount factor UK 1,0026 0,0016 0,0000
Rel discount factor IRL 1,0024 0,0015 0,0000
Rel discount factor NOR 1,0021 0,0017 0,0000
Rel discount factor NZL 1,0058 0,0016 0,0000
Rel discount factor POR 1,0040 0,0017 0,0000
Rel discount factor BEL 1,0045 0,0016 0,0000
Rel discount factor FIN 1,0032 0,0018 0,0000
NOTE: Continuously-updated GMM. Newey-West adjustment for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
42Table 11: Contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the partner countries
(1970-2008) as measured by the std of the gap (CRRA preferences)
Partner country ρ =1 .32 ρ =4 ρ =5
CAN 2,5 4,39 5,21
AUS 4,18 *** 5,65 *** 6,39 **
FR 4,70 *** 5,84 *** 6,41 **
ITA 4,63 *** 5,99 *** 6,70 **
JAP 5,24 *** 7,05 *** 7,98 ***
NDL 5,05 *** 6,97 *** 7,89 ***
ES 4,89 *** 6,17 *** 6,80 ***
SWE 5,03 *** 7,81 *** 9,09 ***
CH 5,23 *** 6,05 *** 6,51 **
UK 4,77 *** 6,70 *** 7,64 ***
IRL 4,57 *** 6,07 *** 6,86 ***
NOR 4,53 *** 7,02 *** 8,22 ***
NZL 5,29 *** 9,05 *** 10,75 ***
POR 5,07 *** 7,65 *** 8,81 ***
BEL 4,87 *** 6,05 *** 6,66 ***
FIN 4,9 *** 7,30 *** 8,47 ***
NOTE: Asterisks next to each standard deviation denote the level of signiﬁcance (* denotes the 10%
level, ** the 5%, *** the 1% ) of the Wald test for the null hypothesis σ(gapUS,CAN)=σ(gapUS,j).
43Table 12: Reduction in the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the partner
countries, detected as structural breaks in the variance of the gap (CRRA preferences)
Partner country No. breaks Date % reduction
ITA 2 *** 1993 36,74%
NDL 2 *** 1993 35,15%
ES 2 *** 1993 35,15%
SWE 1 *** 1993 34,39%
CH 1 *** 1993 38,34%
UK 2 *** 1992 60,31%
POR 1 *** 1993 35,19%
BEL 1 * 1993 32,13%
AUS 0 / /
CAN 0 / /
FR 0 / /
JAP 0 / /
IRL 0 / /
NOR 0 / /
NZL 0 / /
FIN 0 / /
NOTE: Asterisks next to the number of breaks indicate their signiﬁcance (* for 10%, ** for 5%, *** for
1%) according to the test of no change versus a number k of breaks. See Qu and Perron (2007) for details
on this test.
44Table 13: IV regressions — dependent variable: gap(US,j), CRRA preferences
UK 1978-1992 1993-2008 ITA 1978-1992 1993-2008
US gdp -0,97 *** -0,63 *** (·) US gdp -1,06 *** -0,52 *** (·)
UK gdp 1,02 *** 0,05 (··· ) ITA gdp 0,81 ** 0,94 ***
US govt -0,97 *** -0,6 *** US govt -1,11 *** -0,55 *** (··)
UK govt 1,06 *** -0,39 (··· ) ITA govt 0,61 0,33
NER 1,12 *** 0,99 *** (·) NER 1,00 *** 1,04 ***
OECD gdp -0,17 -0,32 OECD gdp 0,11 -0,45 *** (··· )
NDL 1978-1992 1993-2008 ESP 1978-1992 1993-2008
US gdp -0,75 *** -1,19 *** (··) US gdp -0,85 *** -0,42 *** (··· )
NDL gdp 0,19 *** 0,49 *** (··) ESP gdp 0,36 *** 0,63 ***
US govt -0,52 ** -0,92 *** (·) US govt -0,72 *** -0,38 *** (··· )
NDL govt -0,22 0,2 ESP govt 0,53 *** 0,73 ***
NER 1,11 *** 0,87 *** (··) NER 1,04 *** 0,98 *** (·)
OECD gdp 0,03 -0,14 OECD gdp 0,03 -0,03
NOTE: * next to the coeﬃcients denotes their signiﬁcance computed using Newey-West adjusted standard
errors with maximum lag length 10. (· next to 1993-2008 coeﬃcients indicates that the coeﬃcient changed
signiﬁcantly with respect to its 1978-1992 value, and shows the level of signiﬁcance.
45Table 14: IV regressions — dependent variable: gap(US,j), CRRA preferences
SWE 1978-1992 1993-2008 CH 1978-1992 1993-2008
US gdp -0,97 *** -0,49 ** (··) US gdp -0,74 *** -0,62 ***
SWE gdp 0,34 *** 0,34 CH gdp 0,29 * 0,3 ***
US govt -0,69 ** -0,56 ** US govt -0,78 *** -0,54 ***
SWE govt 0,07 0,53 * CH govt 0,65 *** 0,32 *** (·)
NER 1,01 *** 0,99 *** NER 1,01 *** 0,98 ***
OECD gdp 0,64 ** -0,12 (··) OECD gdp -0,2 * -0,31 ***
POR 1978-1992 1993-2008 BEL 1978-1992 1993-2008
US gdp -0,63 *** -0,42 ** US gdp -0,9 *** -0,66 ** (··)
POR gdp -0,2 0,23 BEL gdp 0,6 ** 1,13 *** (·)
US govt -0,66 *** -0,7 *** US govt -0,91 *** -0,79 ***
POR govt 0,16 0,32 BEL govt 0,97 ** 1,1 **
NER 1,03 *** 0,94 *** NER 0,95 *** 1,02 *** (··)
OECD gdp -0,02 -0,13 OECD gdp 0,02 -0,29 *** (··)
NOTE: See note to Table 3.6
46Table 15: Share of the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the partner country
explained by falls in the variance of shocks and improvements in the degree of insurance
(CRRA preferences)
UK ITA
US gdp 1,66 US gdp 5,52
UK gdp -1,92 ITA gdp 0
US govt 0 US govt -4,54
UK govt 1,3 ITA govt 0
NER 19,23 NER 0
OECD gdp 0 OECD gdp -0,47
Insurance 20,27% Insurance 0,51%
Var(US gdp) 1,87 Var(US gdp) 5,5
Var(UK gdp) 2,88 Var(ITA gdp) -0,18
Var(US gov) 0,25 Var(US gov) 0,79
Var(UK gov) 1,72 Var(ITA gov) 0
Var(NER) 71,26 Var(NER) 83,31
Var(OECD gdp) 0 Var(OECD gdp) 0
Cov(US gdp,NER) 2,46 Cov(US gdp,NER) 0,5
Cov(ITA gdp,NER) 9,92
Shocks 80,43% Shocks 99,85%
NDL ESP
US gdp -6,16 US gdp 4,6
NDL gdp -0,41 ESP gdp 0
US govt 2,1 US govt -2,94
NDL gov 0 ESP gov 0
NER 43,65 NER 20,3
OECD gdp 0 OECD gdp 0
Insurance 39,18% Insurance 21,96%
Var(US gdp) 1,68 Var(US gdp) 4,24
Var(NDL gdp) 0,14 Var(ESP gdp) 0,87
Var(US gov) 0,11 Var(US gov) 0,4
Var(NDL gov) 0 Var(ESP gov) 2
Var(NER) 57,62 Var(NER) 74,78
Var(OECD gdp) 0 Var(OECD gdp) 0
Shocks 59,54% Shocks 82,29%
NOTE: Shares are computed using statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at the 10% level
47Table 16: Share of the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the partner country
explained by falls in the variance of shocks and improvements in the degree of insurance
(CRRA preferences)
SWE CH
US gdp 3,54 US gdp 0
SWE gdp 0 CH gdp 0
US govt 0 US govt 0
SWE gov 0 CH gov 0,27
NER 0 NER 0
OECD gdp 1,21 OECD gdp 0
Insurance 4,75% Insurance 0,27%
Var(US gdp) 5,48 Var(US gdp) 2,11
Var(SWE gdp) 0,88 Var(CH gdp) 0
Var(US gov) 0,36 Var(US gov) 0,31
Var(SWE gov) 0 Var(CH gov) 0,32
Var(S) 84,33 Var(S) 96,08
Var(OECD gdp) 0,34 Var(OECD gdp) 0,02
Cov(SWE gdp,NER) 7,64
Shocks 99,04% Shocks 98,84%
POR BEL
US gdp 0 US gdp 5,34
POR gdp 0 BEL gdp -6,86
US govt 0 US govt 0
POR gov 0 BEL gov 0
NER 0 NER -34,19
OECD gdp 0 OECD gdp -0,31
Insurance 0% Insurance -36,02%
Var(US gdp) 2,64 Var(US gdp) 6,34
Var(POR gdp) 0 Var(BEL gdp) 0,85
Var(US gov) 0,38 Var(US gov) 0,85
Var(POR gov) 0 Var(BEL gov) 1,3
Var(NER) 95,17 Var(NER) 113,3
Var(OECD gdp) 0 Var(OECD gdp) 0
Cov(BEL gdp,NER) 11,43
Shocks 98,18% Shocks 134,06%
NOTE: See note to Table 3.8
48Table 17: Contingent risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the partner countries
(1970-2008) as measured by the std of the gap (CC preferences)

















49Table 18: Gap mean — Campbell and Cochrane preferences


















NOTE: For each partner and CRRA coeﬃcient, the null hypothesis E(gap(US,j))=0 was tested using
Newey-West adjustd standard errors with a maximum autocorrelation lag of 10. In no case could the null
be rejected.
50Table 19: Reductions in the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the partner
countries, detected as structural breaks in the variance of the gap (CC preferences)
Partner No. breaks Date and % reduction Date and % reduction
AUS 1 *** 1987 47% /
CAN 2 *** 1977 43% 1997 44%
FRA 2 *** 1978 29% 1997 45%
ITA 1 *** 1998 51% /
JAP 2 *** 1978 40% 1997 18%
NDL 1 *** 1996 30% /
ESP 1 *** 1983 28% /
SWE 2 *** 1978 55% 1998 44%
CH 2 *** 1983 29% 1999 33%
UK 2 *** 1984 39% 1999 43%
IRL 2 *** 1983 44% 2000 -105%
NOR 2 *** 1977 -111% 1999 47%
NZL 2 *** 1987 51% 1997 62%
POR 2 *** 1983 27% 1991 -96%
BEL 2 *** 1983 34% 1999 34%
FIN 1 *** 1978 61% /
NOTE: See note to Table 3.5
51Table 20: IV regressions — dependent variable: gap(US,j), CC preferences
CAN Break 1 Break 2
1970-1977 1977-1984 1986-1997 1997-2008
US gdp -13,6 *** -5,81 ** (··· ) -12,5 ** -10,9 ***
L1 21,4 *** 3,35 ** (··· ) 0,8 5,1 **
L2 -8,14 ** -2,53 ** (··) -0,7 6,1 **
CAN gdp 6,91 ** 24,8 *** (··· ) 16,65 ** 6,5 *
L1 -13,03 ** -32,27 *** (··· ) -6,2 -3,6
L2 -6,84 *** 25,32 *** (··· ) -1,9 -1,2
US govt -0,05 -2,97 -13 ** -2,7 (··)
L1 1,34 8,64 ** (··) 2,5 2,5
L2 -16,02 *** -0,61 5,5 1,9
CAN govt 8,72 *** 16,8 *** 21,2 * 1 (·)
L1 -14,3 *** -32,4 *** (··· ) -10 -4
L2 0,08 9,1 ** (··) -0,1 -2,6
NER 3,71 -6,91 *** -1,3 2,5 ***
OECD gdp 0,96 -19,4 *** (··· ) 6,7 -6,5 *
JAP Break 1 Break 2
1970-1977 1977-1984 1986-1997 1997-2008
US gdp -6,5 ** -5 -8,1 *** -0,8 (··· )
L1 6,5 ** 12,6 *** (··) 11 *** 1,6 (··· )
L 2 - 1 , 2 3 , 1* *( ··) -2,9 6,2 ** (··)
JAP gdp 10,6 *** 25,6 *** (··· ) 13,9 *** 7,7 *** (··· )
L1 -11,3 *** -14 *** -19,2 *** -3 *** (··· )
L2 1,6 -4,2 6,1 *** -4,8 *
US govt -10,9 ** -0,5 (··) -7,5 *** -1,3 (··· )
L1 10,6 17,9 *** (··· ) 10,8 *** 1,7 (··· )
L2 -11,6 * 13,7 ** (··· ) 2,7 0,1
JAP govt 17,1 *** 10 *** (··) 2,3 3,7
L1 -18,3 *** -21 *** -14,48 *** -4,4 *** (··· )
L2 3,8 *** -7,6 -0,6 2,5
N E R 0 , 7 0 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 6* *( ··)
OECD gdp 6,3 -9,9 -1,6 -16,6 *** (··· )
NOTE: See note to Table 3.6. L1 and L2 denote ﬁrst and second lags
52Table 21: IV regressions — dependent variable: gap(US,j), CC preferences
CH Break 1 Break 2
1970-1983 1983-1996 1990-1999 1999-2008
US gdp -4,6 * -11,9 *** (··· ) -14,1 *** -5 *** (··· )
L1 13,5 *** 12 *** 12,2 *** 5,7 *** (··)
L 2 0 , 6- 3 , 52 , 60 , 4
CH gdp -19,6 ** 0,4 (··· ) 1,1 -1,8
L1 25,6 *** 4,6 *** (··· ) -0,2 7,1 *** (··· )
L2 -9,1 -2,6 1,12 -2,6 ** (··)
US govt -11,3 *** .10,7 *** -18,4 *** -6,8 *** (··· )
L1 11,7 ** 8 *** 12,4 *** 1,6 (··· )
L2 8,6 2 8,6 *** 2 (··· )
CH govt -9,6 1,7 11,2 *** -1,1 (··· )
L 1 0 , 1 1 , 5*( ·) -0,5 7 ** (··)
L2 9,4 * -1,6 (·) -1,6 -1,4
NER -1,9 0,5 ** (··) 0,6 1,6 ** (··)
OECD gdp -1,6 1,4 3,6 * -5,2 ***
UK Break 1 Break 2
1970-1983 1983-1996 1990-1999 1999-2008
US gdp -8,6 *** -11 *** -7,6 ** -5,9 *
L1 11,3 *** 17 *** (·) 10,5 *** -0,1 (··· )
L2 -3,5 -8,2 *** (··· ) -4 -9,5 *** (··· )
UK gdp 9,1 *** 1,9 (··· ) 0,6 -1,07
L1 -11 *** -0,3 (··· ) -15,7 ** 1,3 (··)
L2 -0,1 -4,4 19,1 *** 10,8 *
US govt -13,5 * -9,3 *** -8 *** -10,4 ***
L1 3,3 9,5 *** (··· ) 7,2 ** -0,3 (··)
L2 -14,5 ** -2,1 (··) 0,1 -5,7 *** (··)
UK govt 7,9 ** -0,03 (··) -7,8 -13,1 ** (··)
L1 -11,2 ** -1,2 (··) -7,1 7,2
L2 0,3 -7,7 12,9 9,2
NER 1,8 *** 1 -0,9 1,44 ** (··)
OECD gdp 1,2 2,2 7,4 4,4
NOTE: See note to Table 3.13
53Table 22: IV regressions — dependent variable: gap(US,j), CC preferences
FRA 1971-1978 1978-1985 NDL 1985-1996 1996-2007
US gdp -17,55 *** -11,1 *** US gdp 1,3 -10,7 *** (··· )
L1 13,4 *** 9,9 *** (··· ) L1 4,4 11 *** (··· )
L2 -1,9 1,4 L2 -7,7 *** 6,7 **
FRA gdp -15,5 ** 23,5 *** NDL gdp 7,1 * 5,1 *
L1 -2,1 14,7 *** (··· ) L1 -9,5 *** -12,8 ***
L2 -5,3 *** -9,8 L2 2,5 -0,5
US govt -23,5 *** -14,3 *** US govt 3,3 -9,2 *** (··· )
L1 15,6 *** 3,5 (··· ) L1 -5,6 11 *** (··· )
L2 -6,4 * 10,1 *** L2 0,2 4,7
FRA govt -33,3 *** 17 (··· ) NDL govt 0,7 1,8
L1 -9,8 ** -13,8 (··) L 1 - 1 4 , 6* * - 7* * *
L2 17,2 *** -15,4 * L2 -8,9 -1,8
NER -1,05 2,3 *** NER 4,2 ** 0,3 (··)
OECD gdp 13,9 -10 *** OECD gdp 2,4 -0,3
ITA 1987-1998 1998-2008 FIN 1970-1977 1977-1984
US gdp -18,8 *** -10,8 *** US gdp -17,8 ** -16,9 ***
L1 10,5 ** 1,05 (··) L1 25,3 *** 9,9 *** (··· )
L2 8,1 * 4,8 L2 29,5 *** 1,2 (··· )
ITA gdp 17,4 9,5 ** (··) FIN gdp 10,8 *** -12,4 ***
L1 -9,2 -1,8 L1 -26,9 *** -10,7 *** (··· )
L2 3,4 -5,9 *** (··· ) L2 2,8 6,2 *** (··· )
US govt -15,5 *** -7,6 *** US govt 124,5 *** -10,5 ** (··· )
L1 -2,4 1,7 L1 50,8 *** 13,13 *** (··· )
L2 5,7 -2,4 L2 34,9 *** 13,92 ***
ITA govt 34,7 *** 1,7 (··· ) FIN govt -22,2 *** 4,8 (··· )
L 1 - 2 , 6 7 , 2* *( ··) L1 -25,8 *** -6 (··· )
L2 -12,5 * -7,7 ** L2 71,4 *** -28,6 *
NER -2,4 *** 2,5 *** NER 11,7 0,5
OECD gdp 6,5 -2,5 OECD gdp 29,9 *** 41,1 ***
NOTE: See note to Table 3.13
54Table 23: IV regressions — dependent variable: gap(US,j), CC preferences
NZL 1986-1997 1997-2008
US gdp -5,2 -8,5 *** (··· )
L1 27,2 *** 9,5 *** (··· )
L2 -17,7 ** -10 ***
NZL gdp 8,7 *** 3,4 (··· )
L1 -10,8 *** -5,7 *** (··)
L2 1,4 0,3
US govt 6,9 -8,2 *** (··· )
L1 14,5 ** 6,4 **
L2 -5 9,2 *** (··· )
NZL govt 4,1 ** 3,3 (··)
L1 -12 *** -7,7 *** (··)
L2 4,7 ** 1,3 (··)
NER 5,2 *** 0,9 * (··)
OECD gdp -13,8 *** 1,3 (··· )
BEL 1990-1999 1999-2008
US gdp -9,2 *** -7,6 ***
L1 9,08 8,2 *** (··· )
L2 5,8 0,4
BEL gdp 0,4 9,7 * (·)
L1 11 * -2,7 (·)
L2 -13 *** -0,8 (··· )
US govt -12,3 *** -10,2 ***
L1 6,2 4,8 ** (··)
L2 9,7 ** 3,3 ** (·)
BEL govt 0,1 5,7 *** (··· )
L1 30 0,2
L2 -27,3 -0,7
NER 0,5 1,04 *** (··· )
OECD gdp 2,5 -8,8 *** (··· )
NOTE: See note to Table 3.13
55Table 24: Share of the reduction in the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the
partner country explained by falls in the variance of shocks and improvements in the
degree of insurance (CC preferences)
JAP 1978 break 1997 break CAN 1997 break
US gdp -54,32 7,55 US gdp 0
JAP gdp -200,21 38,21 CAN gdp 0
US govt -17,86 9,72 US govt -200,42
JAP govt 44,59 15,68 CAN govt -345,85
NER 0 -8,85 NER 0
OECD gdp 0 -9,25 OECD gdp 0
Insurance -227,7% 53% Insurance -546,2%
Var(US gdp) -11,62 2,21 Var(US gdp) 11,33
Var(JAP gdp) 64,97 30,96 Var(CAN gdp) 311,6
Var(US gov) -11,42 1,09 Var(US gov) 34,29
Var(JAP gov) 297,83 10,45 Var(CAN gov) 394,65
Var(NER) 0 0 Var(NER) 0
Var(OECD) 0 0 Var(OECD) 0
C(gdps) -11,97 2,24 C(gdps) -105,61
Shocks 327,7% 46,9% Shocks 646,2%
UK 1984 break 1999 break CH 1983 break 1999 break
US gdp -189,77 12,58 US gdp -58,93 30,14
UK gdp 191,43 47,3 CH gdp 223,4 -0,39
US govt 78,68 -4,06 US govt 0 77,15
UK govt 79,88 -36,9 CH govt 19,04 1,96
NER 0 -8,4 NER -0,62 -18,24
OECD gdp 0 0 OECD gdp 0 -1,02
Insurance 160,2% 10,5% Insurance 182,8% 89,6%
Var(US gdp) 97,28 3,31 Var(US gdp) 61,89 5,35
Var(UK gdp) 29,34 84,34 Var(CH gdp) -80,23 0
Var(US gov) -111,33 1,84 Var(US gov) -52,34 7
Var(UK gov) 2,32 0 Var(CH gov) -15,32 -2,32
Var(NER) -19,22 0 Var(NER) 0 0
Var(OECD) 0 0 Var(OECD) 0 0,37
C(gdps) -31,62 0 C(gdps) 2,48
Shocks -33,2% 89,4% Shocks -83,5% 10,4%
NOTE: See note to Table 3.8
56Table 25: Share of the reduction in the risk-sharing ineﬃciency between the US and the
partner country explained by falls in the variance of shocks and improvements in the
degree of insurance (CC preferences)
NDL 1996 break BEL 1983 break
US gdp -141,84 US gdp -95,41
NDL gdp 0 BEL gdp 144,73
US govt -190,91 US govt 99,48
NDL govt 0 BEL govt -26,75
NER 591,52 NER -64,5
OECD gdp 0 OECD gdp -58,54
Insurance 258,77 Insurance -0,99
Var(US gdp) 9,3 Var(US gdp) 13,88
Var(NLD gdp) -111,48 Var(BEL gdp) 54,77
Var(US gov) 0 Var(US gov) 32,34
Var(NLD gov) -204,62 Var(BEL gov) 0
Var(NER) 166,6 Var(NER) 0
Var(OECD) 0 Var(OECD) 0
Shocks -140,2 Shocks 100,99
FIN 1978 break ITA 1999 break
US gdp -419,87 US gdp 35,42
FIN gdp 463,39 ITA gdp -6,6
US govt 170,9 US govt 0
FIN govt 116,89 ITA govt 47,77
NER 0 NER 0
OECD gdp 0 OECD gdp 0
Insurance 331,31 Insurance 76,59
Var(US gdp) -133,37 Var(US gdp) -1,3
Var(FIN gdp) 182,24 Var(ITA gdp) 0
Var(US gov) -461,97 Var(US gov) 1,98
Var(FIN gov) 91,13 Var(ITA gov) 29,46
Var(NER) 0 Var(NER) 6,12
Var(OECD) 93,47 Var(OECD) 0
Shocks -228,5 Shocks 36,26
NOTE: See note to Table 3.8
57